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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CORPORATE POWERS AND LIABILITIES WHETHER
CLAUSE IN CORPORATE BOND PREVENTS SUIT AT LAW AFTER

CORPORATIONS -

"No-ACTION"
MATURITY

BY

HOLDER UNABLE

TO

SECURE

SUFFICIENT

PERCENTAGE

OF

HOLDERS TO JOIN IN DEMAND ON TRUSTEE-In Gordon v. Conlon
1
poration,
the holder of two corporate bonds, part of a large issue,

Corsued
at law in his own name to recover the amount due thereon at maturity.
Judgment in his favor was granted over objection that all right of
action upon such bonds, whether by reason of default prior to maturity or for any other reason, was vested in the trustee named in the
trust agreement securing such issue unless upon failure of the trustee
to act after demand made by a specified percentage of the holders of
such bonds. It appeared that the greater proportion of such holders
had consented to an extension of the maturity date, and it was impossible by reason thereof for the plaintiff to procure enough other
uncommitted holders to join in a sufficient demand. On appeal, such
judgment was reversed when the Appellate Court for the First Dis1 323 Ill. App. 380, 55 N. E. (2d) 821 (1944).
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trict found that the limitation of the trust agreement, suitably incorporated in the bonds themselves, prevented any action whatever
except in the name of the trustee.
One earlier Illinois case might seem to oppose the holding in the
instant case, for the reported headnote to the abstract opinion therein
suggests that limitations of the type in question do not apply to suits
at law after maturity.2 Examination of the record therein, however,
discloses that the precise question here involved was given little
attention and the case was settled on other points. The instant case,
therefore, marks the first time the issue has been squarely decided in
this state.
In the absence of suitable limitation in the bond, it is fundamental
law that the holder of a bond secured by a mortgage or a trust indenture has, after maturity, the right to sue at law to recover the amount
promised independently of any restriction contained in the mortgage
or trust indenture with reference to its foreclosure, for he is the holder
of two separate and distinct rights. 3 His right to enforce the bond
independently of the mortgage may, however, be limited by suitable
provisions particularly if such provisions be reasonable ones. 4

But

such restrictions are generally subject to strict construction for they
derogate against the common-law rights of creditors' and will not be
enforced unless there is not only reference to the same but also suitable limitation on the face of the bond itself showing that the rights
of the holder are qualified rather than absolute.' Tested in that light,
the qualification on the face of the bonds involved in the instant case
was clearly sufficient to warn the holder that he possessed no unqualified promise.
The principal ground relied on, however, was that the acts of the
corporate debtor and of the trustee, acting in conjunction with the
greater percentage of the bondholders, in extending the maturity date
of all bonds owned by such persons had rendered it impossible for the
plaintiff to comply with such restrictions, hence he was entitled to be
relieved therefrom. Inability to obtain joint action from a sufficient
percentage of other holders has been held no excuse for not complying
with the requirement of such restrictive clauses in cases involving almost identical facts to the instant case 7 and it has even been held that
such restriction cannot be avoided by showing that the greater percentage of holders were acting collusively to defeat the rights of the
" Kaleta v. Archer Coal & Material Co., 287 Ill. App. 631. 5 N. E. (2d) 879 (1936).
3 Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336 Il1. 450, 168 N. E. 266 (1929) ; Rogers v. Meyers, 68
111. 92 (1873).
4 See annotation in 108 A. L. R. 88, particularly p. 90. and cases there cited.
5 Boley v. Lake Street Elev. R. Co., 64 11.
App. 305 (1896).
6 Oswianza v. Wengler & Mandell, 358 Ill. 302, 193 N. E. 123 (1934), affirming
273 Il. App. 239 (1934).
7

See, for example, Crothwaite v. Moline Plow Co., 298 F. 466 (1924).
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minority.' It has also been held that, for purpose of computation, the
required percentage must be calculated on the total amount of outstanding bonds and not just a percentage of those which have not been
extended or committed to a reorganization. So essential would seem
compliance with such restrictions.that in Central States Life Insurance Company v. Koplar Company' ° recovery was denied, in the absence of demand on the trustee, even though the holder was said to
possess "almost all the bonds.""
More equitable would seem the holdings in other cases which have
permitted suit, even though plaintiff lacked sufficient holdings to
warrant demand on the trustee, when it appeared that the majority
holder was an operating company which deliberately withheld the
payment of interest at a time when, by reason of its large holdings,
it could postpone action as long as it pleased1 2 or where the balance
of the issue was in the hands of one holder who had refused to give
consent. 12 Courts have even gone so far as to construe such restrictions narrowly so as not to defeat a suit at law after maturity at the
instance of a minority holder, 4 such restraint being limited to apply
reach the security pledged for
only to equitable actions designed to
1
the collective benefit of all holders.
While there may be valid reason for clauses of this type where
joint action is desirable, as in case of an election to declare the entire
issue due and to foreclose in case of an interim default, there seems
.a certain injustice in denying to the creditor, no matter how small,
his right to any action after maturity particularly where he cannot,
by reason of means beyond his control, muster sufficient strength to
compel action in his behalf. Under the rule of the instant case, such
denial might even result in loss of the total claim by lapse of time for
unless he joins in the extension and obtains the benefits thereof his
claim might eventually be outlawed although, through no fault of his
own, he cannot prosecute suit. It would seem more just to permit
recovery or else to require, in the interest of reasonableness, that
clauses of this nature should provide that upon approval of a sufficient percentage of holders all bonds of the same issue should be
P. MORAN
extended so as to mature at the same time.
8 Florida Nat. Bank v. Jefferson Standard L. Ins. Co., 123 Fla. 525, 167 So. 378
(1936), rehearing denied 125 Fla. 386, 169 So. 729 (1936).
9 Varner v. Atlanta Laundries, 182 Ga. 148, 184 S. E. 877 (1936).
10 80 F. (2d) 754 (1936).
11 In Southern National Bank v. Germania Mfg. Co., 176 N. C. 318, 97 S. E. 1

(1918), however, action was not denied when it appeared that plaintiff held the
entire issue.
12 Linder v. Hartwell R. Co., 73 F. 320 (1896).
1:3
Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498, 286 P. 936 (1930).
14 Bullowa v. Thermnoid Co., 114 N. J. L. 205, 176 A. 596 (1935).
15 Hoyt v. E. I. DuPont DeNenours Powder Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 196. 102 A, 666
(1917).
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THROUGH LICENSED BROKERS OPERATING ON A COMMISSION BASIS CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF SECURITIES LAW SO AS TO ENTITLE PURCHASER TO

Scully v. DeMet, the Appellate Court for
the First District was asked to interpret and apply Section 5 of the socalled "Blue Sky Law' 2 which deals with the exemption which may
be granted to the sale of securities not registered under the Securities
Law. The facts therein disclosed that at the time of incorporation in
Delaware of the company concerned the defendants received some
twenty thousand shares in a voting trust covering the common stock
thereof for their minority interest in the enterprise so incorporated.
These shares were held by the defendants as their individual property
until 1936 when a block of fifteen thousand of such voting trust shares
was sold to the public through a firm of licensed brokers. Plaintiffs,
who had held preferred shares of the corporation, were induced by the
salesmen of such brokerage firm to sell the preferred stock and to buy
shares in the voting trust so offered and they acquired an aggregate
of two hundred and forty of the shares so sold. Upon learning that
the stock was not qualified under the Securities Act, the plaintiffs
tendered return of the stock so purchased and sued for the return of
the purchase price. Judgment for the plaintiff in the trial court upon
summary proceedings was affirmed when the Appellate Court held
that the sales were not exempt as claimed by the defendants.
RECOVER PURCHASE PRICE-In

The prime defense to the action was that the sale fell within an
exemption which declares that any security sold "by or on behalf of
a vendor who is not an issuer, or underwriter or promoter of the issuer, or a dealer or broker; and who, being a bona fide owner of such
security, disposes of his own property for his own account" 3 shall be
treated as a sale of class "B" securities and, as a consequence, the right
of recision granted by the statute4 was unavailable. It was also argued that, inasmuch as the securities were sold through a broker "on
behalf of a vendor" in the aforementioned category, the fact that
1 323 Ill. App. 74, 55 N. E. (2d) 101 (1944). It is understood that leave to appeal
was sought and denied. Thereafter, a petition was presented by a number of
attorneys customarily representing security dealers for leave to appear as amic!
curiae. They sought to have the Illinois Supreme Court reconsider its action and
grant leave to appeal. Such request has apparently been denied. The reported
decision of the Appellate Court states that judgments totalling in excess of the
jurisdictional amount were granted the several plaintiffs, but it does not reveal if
any single plaintiff recovered more than $1500.00. If not, there is doubt that the
Illinois Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review in the absence of a
certificate of importance:
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 199(2).
See also
Antosz v. Goss Motors, Inc., 378 Ill. 608, 39 N. E. (2d) 322 (1942), and Martin v.
Martin's Estate, 377 Ill. 392, 36 N. E. (2d) 742 (1941), both noted in 20 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvImv 174.

2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121%, § 100.
3 Ibid., § 100(1).
4 Ibid., § 132.
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intermediaries were used in the transaction was of no legal significance.
Little was said in the opinion on the last point, for the court
decided the case on the major issue, but there is occasion to doubt that
the sale was "on behalf of the vendor" as the defendants gave the
brokerage firm unrestricted power to sell to whom it pleased at any
price it pleased so long as the defendants received a net sum fixed
by them. Any amount realized over that figure was to be retained by
the brokerage firm as a commission. It would appear from the facts
of the case, however, that the sales made did net the brokers an
unusual profit so as to give the impression that the brokers were
more than just intermediaries in the transaction. While the statute
fixes no limit to the broker's compensation 6 and there is nothing in
the general law which prevents an agent from being compensated on
the basis of whatever he may procure over a given figure,7 the policy
behind the Securities Act would seem to dictate that the intermediary
conducting a sale "on behalf of" a vendor should be limited to reasonable compensation so as not to be tempted, by his own cupidity, to
take advantage of unwary purchasers.
Of principal significance, though, is the holding on the major issue, i.e. whether or not the sales came within the statutory exemption.
No precedent exists on this point for the instant case represents the
first time the question has been posed since the statute was amended
in 1933. Prior to that time only an isolated transaction could be classed
as exempt" and the law then clearly did not contemplate an indiscriminate public offering of securities.' That limitation was not carried over into the present statute so it would seem, on the surface,
from the fact of such deletion, that the legislature intended that a
vendor selling on his own account should be free to dispose of his
holdings in a block or peddle the same to many purchasers if he so
saw fit. It might be, if the vendor's holding was extensive, that sale
thereof could only be accomplished in the last mentioned way so that
change in the statute could be said to reflect legislative recognition
of that possibility. When it is also noticed that the phrase "on behalf
The shares appear to have cost plaintiffs $7.00 each, -while the defendants received $4.375 thereof. Maximum commissions for odd-lot sales of stocks registered
on the New York Stock Exchange selling below $10.00 per share would be approximately twelve cents per share as contrasted with the $2.625 per share received as
"commission" by the brokers in the instant case.
6111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121Y2, § llSe(p), indicates that taking a "grossly unfair advantage" of a customer is ground for revoking the dealer's license.
7 Hutton v. Renner. 74 Ill. App. 124
(1897); Apple-Cole Co. v. Maibohm, 295
Ill. App. 613, 15 N. E. (2d) 61 (1938).
s Laws 1921, p. 360. The 1919 statute had contained the limitation that such sales
were exempt only "when not made in the course of continued and repeated transactions of a similar nature." See Laws 1919, p. 355.
9 Hudson v. Silver, 273 Ill. App. 40 (1933) ; People v. Weese, 225 Mich. 480, 196
N. W. 516 (1923).
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of" a vendor was likewise inserted into the original act, 10 further
strength is given to the defendants' argument that the legislature not
only realized the necessity of giving the vendor the right to make
many piecemeal sales of his holdings, if necessary, but also considered
that it might, because of the multiplicity thereof, be practical to use
the services of a skilled organization such as is possessed by the average licensed brokerage firm.
Plausible as such argument might seem, the Appellate Court went
deeper into the problem of ascertaining the legislative intent than can
be done just by drawing inferences from changes in language or
grammatical context. It observed that the prime purpose of the whole
statutory scheme was to shield the public at large, particularly those
members thereof apt to invest in stocks, from the dishonesty or irresponsibility of persons engaged in the business of disposing of securities of uncertain value." Individual buyers who lacked the means of
investigation, it found, were to be protected by the statute from the
usual consequences of the doctrine of caveat emptor.1 2 When such
fundamental purposes were borne in mind, it was seen that offerings
such as were made in the instant case would be the very sort of thing
most apt to mislead members of the investing public. Such persons
would be the ones most likely to draw assurance, from the fact of a
public offering through a licensed broker, that the securities purchased were suitable for investment. It was also deemed unlikely
that any significance would be given to the statement, if made, that
the broker was making the offering on behalf of a vendor of unregistered securities. For these reasons, the court concluded that the
transaction was contrary to the spirit of the whole act in question as
well as not permitted by the letter of the specific provision relied
on by the defendants.
There is some doubt as to the correctness of the court's conclusion that the transaction violated the letter of the law, for, as has been
pointed out, the sales measured up to the apparent standard laid down
in that (1) they were made on behalf of a vendor who was not an
issuer, and (2) were superficially, at least, made for his own account.
If the court were limited to applying the law as it is written, the
action taken would then be clearly improper and should call for reversal. But ambiguity and doubt may exist not alone over the letter
but also as to the spirit of a statute. In such a case it is as much the
10 The present phraseology first appeared in the 1931 revision: Laws 1931, p.
820. Prior thereto the law had permitted sales by the owner's representative:
Laws 1921, p. 360.
11 Stewart v. Brady, 300 I1. 425, 133 N. E. 310 (1921); Brannan, Beckham &
Co. v. Ramsaur, 41 Ga. App. 166, 152 S. E. 282 (1930); State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N. W. 937 (1920).
12 Douthit v. Swiney, 310 Il1. 180, 141 N. E. 535 (1923).
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duty of the court to resolve the ambiguity or doubt"3 as it would be
to construe a conflict in language.14 No better solution for a difficulty
of that nature can be had than to ascertain the fundamental legislative
purpose and seek to effectuate it. There being a conflict between the
letter and the spirit of the exemption here involved, the court acted
properly in endeavoring to resolve the same and it would seem to
have correctly interpreted the legislative objective.
It might be urged that the Securities Law, being opposed to
common law principles, should be strictly construed. Such at least
has been the intimation in cases dealing with penalty provisions of
other statutes. 15 But if the fundamental- purpose of the Securities
Law is to protect the investing public rather than to facilitate the
disposition of securities owned, so narrow an attitude could well be
dispensed with.1 6

LANDLORD

W. A. MCCLINTOCK, JR.

AND TENANT-TERMINATION

OF AN ESTATE FOR YEARS-

LIABILITY OF TENANT AFTER TENANCY HAS BEEN TERMINATED BY LEGAL
FOR RENT ALREADY ACCRUED-An unusual point of law
was presented to the Appellate Court for the First District in the
recent case of Metropolitan Trust Company v. Fishman' where it
appeared that the defendant had entered into a lease with a receiver
of an apartment hotel building but subsequently defaulted in the payment of rent and taxes. The plaintiff, a successor-receiver, upon such
default, petitioned the court for a writ of assistance which was
granted. The order, however, not only directed plaintiff to resume
possession but also directed that "the lease . . . be . . . cancelled." 2
PROCEEDINGS

Thereafter, within ten years from the date of such order, the present
action was brought to recover the amount of unpaid rent and taxes
due under the lease and accrued prior to its termination. Defense to
such suit was based on the contention that the cancellation of the
lease made it null and void ab initio extinguishing all liability thereunder, or if not, that as the action was commenced more than five years
13 It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that courts are governed by the legislative intention rather than by the exact words used: Burke v.
Industrial Commission, 368 Ill. 554. 15 N. E.

(2d) 305, 119, A. L. R. 1152 (1938).;

Smith v. Logan County, 284 Ill. 163, 119 N. E. 932 (1918) : Hoyne v. Danisch, 264
Il1. 467, 106 N. E. 341 (1914). When so construing, words may be modified, altered,
or supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with such intention:
People v. Wallace, 291 Ill. 465, 126 N. E. 175 (1920) ; Furlong v. South Park Commissioners, 320 Ill. 507, 151 N. E. 510 (1926).
14 Baker & Conrad v. Chicago Heights Const. Co., 364 Il1. 386, 4 N. E. (2d) 953
(1936).
15 See, for example, C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. People, 217 Ill. 164, 75 N. E. 368
(1903).

16 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (Callaghan & Co., Chicago,
194-3), 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, p. 391.

1323 Ill. App. 413, 55 N. E. (2d) 837 (1944).
2 323 Ill. App. 413 at 414, 55 N. E. (2d) 837.

Leave to appeal has been denied.
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after the date of the order, the action was barred2 Judgment for
plaintiff in the trial court was affirmed when the Appellate Court
held that the word "cancelled" as used in the order was used inadvertently; that the effect of such cancellation was merely to terminate
the relationship of landlord and tenant but not the express agreement
to pay rent and taxes which had accrued; and that defendant's liability was not barred.
Definitions of the word "cancel," found in other contract cases,
suggest a purpose to annul and destroy, and necessarily imply a waiver
of all rights thereunder. 4 - For that reason, after a contract is discharged either by recission or by substitution of a new contract, no
action can be maintained upon the original contract but any benefits
accruing to either party by a part performance, unless expressly released, must be recovered in an action on quantum meruit or quantum
valebant5 That word also possesses the meaning to make void or
invalid.6 When one party rescinds or repudiates a contract, he merely
gives notice to the other party that he does hot propose to be bound
thereby. If a court of equity, however, grants rescission or cancellation it destroys the contract and renders it as though it had never
existed. 7 On the surface, therefore, it would appear that the defendant's contention was sound and plaintiff's right to recover could rest
only upon an implied agreement for use and occupation. But a closer
examination of such cases reveals that they are not in point with the
instant problem either because the cancellation was mutually agreed
upon or because it was ordered by a court upon proper complaint
setting forth fraud or other equitable ground for nullification.
Inadvertent action by the court in the original proceeding herein,
when it declared the lease "cancelled," ought not serve to destroy the
plaintiff's right to rent accrued for any of several reasons. In the
first place, that court had no right, under the facts, to cancel the lease
for plaintiff had not requested such action and the exercise of any
such power would not only amount to a taking of property without
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 83, § 16. The theory underlying that part of the defense
was that, as the suit was one for use and occupation upon an implied agreement,
substituted for the cancelled express agreement, the five-year rather than the tenyear statute applied.
4 Whedon v. Lancaster County, 80 Neb. 682, 114 N. W. 1102 (1908) ; Capital City
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Detwiler, 23 Ill. App. 656 (1887).
5 Lipschutz v. Weatherly & Twiddy, 140 N. C. 365, 53 S. E. 132 (1906), citing
Dreifus v. Columbian Exposition Salvage Co., 194 Pa. 4175, 45 A. 370, 75 Am. St.
Rep. 704 (1900).
6 Clegg v. Schvaneveldt, 79 Utah 195, 9 P. (2d) 620 (1932).

7 United Wool Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. Werner & Co., 102 N. J. Eq. 322, 140
A. 465 (1928).
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due process of law," but would make the order void at least to the
extent that it was without foundation under the issues raised.9
Even though a valid termination of the lease had occurred through
proper legal proceedings, such termination could have only prospective effect. That, at least, is the tenor of analogous cases where leases
have been terminated as the result of legal action. Thus the majority
view, in condemnation proceedings, is that a taking of the whole of
the demised premises under the power of eminent domain terminates
the lease and relieves the tenant of liability to pay rent accruing after
the event but not before."0 Eviction by title paramount will discharge
the lessee from the obligation to pay rent which may fall due, by the
terms of the lease, after eviction." In foreclosure suits, a lease made
subsequent to the mortgage may be terminated provided the lessee is
made a party to the suit. 1 2 If so, the lessee is discharged from liability
for future rent due thereunder 3 but would not be absolved from
accumulated: past due rent. It should follow, therefore, that the
termination of the defendant's right to further possession of the demised premises involved in the instant case should have no bearing
on his liability for rent accrued. It is true that one authority purports
to lay down the rule that "after the cancellation of a lease in legal
proceedings, liability for rent thereunder is extinguished,"' 14 but such
statement is misleading and an examination of the cases cited in support thereof discloses that the only question involved therein was a
right to rent which had accrued after the order of termination. 15
When it is remembered that every lease possesses a double aspect,
U. S. Const., Fifth Amend.
9 See, for example, Holmstedt v. Holmstedt, 383 Ill. 290, 49 N. E. (2d) 25 (1943),
and Kaifer v. Kaifer, 286 Ill. App. 433, 3 N. E. (2d) 886 (1936), noted in 15
CHICAGO-KENT REvI]Ew 72.

10 Stubbings v. Village of Evanston, 136 Ill. 37, 26 N. E. 577, 29 Am. St. Rep. 300,
11 L. R. A. 839 (1891). That result may be achieved by statute in some jurisdictions: Hinrichs v. New Orleans, 50 La. Ann. 1214, 24 So. 224 (1898) ; Spence v.
Charrot, 137 App. Div. 882, 121 N. Y. S. 519 (1910).
11 Corrigan v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N. E. 746, 21 L. R. A. 212 (1893).
12 Richardson v. Hadsall, 106 Ill. 476 (1883); Brush v. Fowler, 36 Ill. 53, 85
Am. Dec. 382 (1864) ; Reichert v. Bankson, 199 Ill. App. 95 (1916) ; Gale v. Carter,
154 Ill. App. 478 (1910) ; Runner v. White, 60 Ill. App. 247 (1895).
13 Jetzinger v. Consumers Sanitary, etc., Stores, 268 Ill. App. 482 (1932) ; Bartlett v. Hitchcock, 10 Ill. App. 87 (1882) ; Reed v. Bartlett, 9 Ill. App. 267 (1881).
See also Stein v. Midway Chevrolet Co., 315 Ill. App. 105, 42 N. E. (2d) 125 (1942).
14 36 C. J., Landlord and Tenant, § 1143, p. 336.
15 In Sigur v. Lloyd, 1 La. Ann. 421 (1846), for example, it was held that where
the lessor sought judgment for rent due and to become due and for a dissolution
of the lease, and defendant acquisced in the prayer for dissolution, the lessee could
not be ordered to pay rent falling due after the dissolution. In Ernst v. Zeltner
Brewing Co., 117 N. Y. S. 922 (1909), lessee, who had been made a party to a
foreclosure proceeding which had terminated the lease, was held not liable on the
lease itself even though he had continued in possession.
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being both a conveyance and a contract,", a ready explanation may be
found for the view that a lease may cease being operative as to the
right of future possession yet remain effective as to past obligations
for rent. The grant may expire or be nullified, but the contract can
survive. Moreover, as a lease is usually a divisible contract, calling
for performance and payment in successive divisions, receipt of a
part performance should create an obligation to pay for that benefit
in spite of a subsequent breach.17 As there was no evidence in the
instant case of an intention to release the tenant from the consequence
of his default except for the unfortunate word "cancelled," nor proof
of consideration furnished to support the idea of an accord and satisfaction, the result achieved in the instant case seems to be eminently
just as well as legally sound.
H. H. FLENTYE

SALES-

CONDITIONAL

SALES-WHETHER

OR

NOT TRANSACTION

IN

FORM OF CONDITIONAL SALE BUT IN FACT ONE OF LENDING AND BORROWING IS EFFECTIVE AGAINST RIGHTS

OF SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT CREDITOR

OF PURPORTED CONDITIONAL VENDEE-In

Raymond v. Horan, Bailif of

Municipal Court of Chicago,' an action to determine plaintiff's right

to certain personal property, it was necessary to ascertain what legal
effect was to be given to a contract which in form and by the intention
of the parties thereto was a conditional sales contract. The facts were
these: One Coburn, desirous of engaging in business, found a likely
location in which were installed suitable fixtures and equipment owned
by a finance company. Coburn borrowed funds from plaintiff and with
this money purchased the fixtures and equipment. On the same day
he executed and delivered to plaintiff a bill of sale covering the property and as part of the same transaction plaintiff purportedly sold
the goods back to Coburn under a conditional sales contract providing for semi-annual payments. The testimony showed that the absolute sale to plaintiff and his re-sale to Coburn under the conditional
sales contract had only one purpose, to-wit: that of securing plaintiff's loan. Subsequently, one of the defendants sold supplies to Coburn and, upon his failure to pay, procured judgment. Execution and
levy on the fixtures and equipment involved was made by the other
defendant. Plaintiff thereupon challenged the right of the judgment
creditor, claiming title under the conditional sales contract. The trial
court decided in favor of plaintiff, but on appeal the judgment was
reversed, the court finding that the purported sale and conditional
resale were but subterfuges and that, in legal effect, the transaction
16

University Club v. Deakin, 265 I1. 257, 106 N. E. 790 (1914).

17 See Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. III, § 861.
1 Sub nom. Appeal of Continental Distributing Co., 323 Ill. App. 120, 55 N. E.
(2d) 99 (1944).
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could not be set
amounted to an unrecorded chattel mortgage which
2
up against the rights of the judgment creditor..
The determination of whether a particular transaction shall have
the legal effect of a conditional sales contract or of a chattel mortgage
is a matter which has caused the courts considerable difficulty. This,
no doubt, is due to the fact that both are in important aspects governed
by the same principles and the relationship of the parties in each
case bears a striking similarity. There are differences, however, the
most important of which is that under a conditional sales contract
the vendor remains owner, subject, to the vendee's right to acquire title
by fulfilling the specified conditions, while in the case of an absolute
sale with a mortgage back the vendee acquires title subject to a lien
brought into existence by the mortgage.4
A sales transaction wherein by the contract of the parties, the
seller then being the unquestioned owner of the chattels involved, it
is expressly provided that the title to the property shall remain in
the vendor until the purchase money is fully paid and by which there
is no reservation of a lien will be, without question, denominated a
conditional sale and not a mortgage? It will also not be disputed
that a transaction wherein the owner of chattels, wishing to borrow
money, effects a loan and pledges the title to the property as security
for the borrowed money is properly classified as a chattel mortgage.
But between these two extreme types of transactions there exist
numerous business dealings which can be classified as one or the other
only after considerable study and then sometimes with grave doubt
as to whether the proper classification has been made. It will also
be found that what may be deemed a conditional sale when only the
rights of the vendor and vendee are being adjudicated by the courts
may, chameleon-like, change its nature and legal effect 7to a chattel
mortgage when the rights of a third party are involved.
2 While the Illinois law makes no provision for recording conditional sales con-

tracts, chattel mortgages, to be binding on third parties, must be recorded: Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95, § 4.
a General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Baker. 291 N. Y. S. 1015 (1936).
4 Stroup v. Meyers, 106 Ind. App. 538, 21 N. E. (2d) 75 (1939)
Mondie v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 178 Oki. 584, 63 P. (2d) 708, (1937).
Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Il. 432, 149 N. E. 225 (1925) ; Conner v.
Borland-Grannis Co., 294 Ill. 58, 128 N. E. 317 (1920) ; Leopold v. Universal Credit
Co., 290 Ill. App. 305, 8 N. E. (2d) 727 (1937) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Piasa Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n. 276 Ill. App. 389 (1934); Horvitz v. Leibowitz, 274 Ill. App. 196
(1934).
6Conard v. The Atlantic Insurance Company of New York, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.)
386, 7 L. Ed. 189 (1828) ; Southern Surety Co. v. People's State Bank of Astoria,
332 Ill. 362, 163 N.* E. 659 (1928) ; Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467, 143 N. E. 61,
32 A. L. R. 989 (1924) ; Citizens State Bank of Manteno v. Senesac, 267 I1. App.
288 (1932).
7 Pietrantonio v. Scalo, 120 Conn. 524. 181 A. 628 (1935).
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Where the nature of the transaction is doubtful, courts have
sought to classify it principally on the basis of the intention of the
parties as disclosed by the entire contract,8 though minor elements
such as the adequacy of the consideration have thrown what otherwise might have been termed a conditional sale into the category of
a chattel mortgage.9 In that regard it may be noted that contracts in
which the vendor has sought a purposeful ambiguity, with a view to
a construction as a conditional sale or a chattel mortgage as may best
fit the vendor's situation when litigation does arise, will in general
be construed and'the doubt resolved against the vendor.10 It has even
been said that the conditional sales contract is not favored in the law
and consequently where the legal nature of the transaction is at all
questionable, it is likely to be construed as a chattel mortgage.1 1
When, however, from a consideration of the entire contract, it clearly
appears that it was the intention of the parties that the transaction
was in its nature a conditional
sale, that construction may be placed
12
upon it by the courts.
If this rule of intention had been adopted by the court in the
instant case, the contract between plaintiff and his vendee would have
been upheld as a valid conditional sale for it was clearly the intention
of the parties that it was to be so regarded. But the court, favoring
the view of the Washington case of Hughbanks, Inc. v. Gourley,"
expressly repudiated the rule of intention for it said, using the words
of that case, that the problem is "not one of determining whether
the parties intended to mould their transaction into the form of a
conditional sale rather than that of a chattel mortgage, but of deciding
whether in a pure financing arrangement the conditional sale can ever
be adopted as a means of securing a loan. And the answer is that the
contract of conditional sale may be used only by an actual vendor in
the economic sense, and not by one who in a particular transaction
occupies the status of a financier or lender of money, even though
the latter may go through the form of taking title and possession of
'14
the chattel which he purports to sell.
8 Keystone Finance Corp. v. Krueger, 17 F. (2d)
904 (1927); Southern Surety
Co. v. People's State Bank of Astoria, 332 Ill. 362, 163 N. E. 659 (1928) ; J. H.
Gerlach Co. v. Noyes, 251 Mass. 558, 147 N. E. 24, 45 A. L. R. 961 (1925).
9 Guilford-Chester Water Co. v. Town of Guilford, 107 Conn. 519, 141 A. 880
(1928) ; Cary & Co. v. Hyer, 91 Fla. 322, 107 So. 684 (1926).
10 Mills Novelty Co. v. Morett, 266 Mich. 451, 254 N. W. 163 (1934).
11 Weaver v. Lapsley, 42 Ala. 601, 94 Am. Dec. 671 (1868) ; Schneider v. Daniel,
191 Ind. 59, 131 N. E. 816, 17 A. L. R. 1410 (1921) ; Low v. Colby, 137 Wash. 476,
243 P. 18 (1926) ; Hughbanks, Inc. v. Gourley, 12 Wash. (2d) 44, 120 P. (2d) 523,
138 A. L. R. 658 (1941).
12 Bailey v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 239 U. S. 268, 36 S. Ct. 50, 60 L. Ed. 275 (1915).
"3 12 Wash. (2d) 44, 120 P. (2d) 523, 138 A. L. R. 658 (1941).
14 323 Ill.
App. 120 at 123,. 55 N. E. (2d) 99 at 100, quoting from Hughbanks v.
Gourley, 12 Wash. (2d) 44, 120 P. (2d) 523 at 526, 138 A. L. R. 658 at 662.
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Although the court did not cite that case, there is some precedent
for such view in the prior Illinois case of First State Bank v. Harter.15
There the alleged conditional vendor never had title and consequently
could reserve none as security, hence its rights under a purported
conditional sales contract were subordinated to those of a judgment
creditor of the supposed conditional vendee. In the instant case the
alleged vendor held title for but a fleeting moment. Even so, the
court disregarded that fact on the ground that reality, not the form
of the instrument, should govern in determining whether the contract
was a conditional sales contract or a chattel mortgage. 16
Illinois and Washington are not alone in holding that the conditional sales contract, with its harsh remedial incidents, must be restricted in its use to bona fide sales transactions between vendor and
vendee and should not be extended to transactions where the true
relationship between the parties is that of creditor and debtor, for at
least six other jurisdictions have adopted the same view. 1 7 In the
light of such holdings, it would seem that one planning to advance
money so as to enable another to purchase some wanted chattel but
anxious to obtain the security of a conditional sales contract must
first, as a middleman, purchase that chattel himself, taking all the
risks of ownership, and then convey it to his "borrower" with an
appropriate reservation of title. Only if he has acquired a full legal
and equitable title thereto can he be treated as a vendor entitled to
the benefits accruing to an unpaid seller upon a resale.18
T. F. BAYER
WILLS WHETHER

RIGHTS

ELECTION

AND
TO

LIABILITIES

RENOUNCE

OF

DEVISEES

PROVISIONS

OF

AND

LEGATEES -

WILL OF

DECEASED

HUSBAND MAY BE MADE BY CONSULAR OFFICER ON BEHALF OF NONRESIDENT ALIEN WIDOW IN ABSENCE OF EXPRESS POWER OF ATTORNEY FROM

393 (1939).
The court therein stated that
15 301 Ill. App. 234, 22 N. E. (2d)
the Uniform Sales Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 1211, § 1, particularly with ref-

erence to conditional sales contracts. "clearly indicates that it is intended to
It is not within the intent
operate as between the seller and buyer of goods ....
or contemplation of the act that such contracts shall supplant or assume the legal
identity of chattel mortgages. They are separate and distinct instruments and
governed by separate and distinct acts." 301 I1. App. 234 at 236, 22 N. E. (2d)
393 at 394.
16 Gray v. Brasee, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 687 (1939).
17 In
re James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (1929); Pietrantonio v. Scalo, 120 Conn.
524. 181 A. 628 (1935) ;Schneider v. Daniel, 191 Ind. 59, 131 N. E. 816, 17 A. L. R.
1410 (1921) ; Southern Finance Co. v. Mercantile Discount Corp., 80 Ind. App. 436,
141 N. E. 250 (1923) ; Acme Feeds, Inc. v. Berg, 231 Iowa 1271, 4 N. W. (2d) 430
(1942); Payne v. Parker, 95 Miss. 375, 48 So. 835 (1909) ; First Nat'l Bank v.
Marlowe, 71 Mont. 461, 230 P. 374 (1924).
is A close analogy can be found in the case of purchase money mortgages of real
estate where the benefit of that type of security can inure only to the grantor and
cannot aid the lender who advances funds to be used to purchase land: Hickson
Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 150 N. C. 282, 63 S. E. 1045, 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 843
(1909).
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important question affecting the
rights of nationals in occupied countries was presented in the recent
New York case of In re Zalewski's Estate' wherein the deceased
testator gave to his widow, 2 resident and national of Poland, a nominal
legacy although he left a large estate. After his will had been admitted to probate, the Consul General of the Republic of Poland
served an instrument on the administrator with the will annexed stating that he, acting on behalf of the widow under power given him by
the treaty between his country and the United States, 3 was exercising
the personal right of election given by the statute 4 to take her share
of the estate as in case of intestacy rather than to accept the provision
of the will. The administrator with the will annexed refused to
recognize such election and his act was upheld by the Surrogate's
HER AUTHORIZING SUCH ACTION-An

Court.5

That decision was affirmed in the Appellate Division of the

New York Supreme Court.6 Upon appeal granted by permission, the
New York Court of Appeals reversed such decision when it held that
the written notice of such election could be made by the Consul
General as the widow's attorney in fact, even though he lacked express
authority from her, as the agency granted by the treaty was not to be
construed to defeat its purpose and the right to "appear" and to "represent" assigned thereby permitted the official to perform useful
duties and was7 not limited to the mere collection of property devised
or bequeathed.

The significance of the instant case lies in the fact that it appears
to be the first of its kind. wherein a consular officer of a foreign nation
1292
opinion
2 The
in fact

Lehman, C. J., wrote a dissenting
N. Y. 332, 55 N. E. (2d) 184 (1944).
in which Rippey, J., and Lewis J.. concurred.
testator left his widow in Poland some forty years ago. Whether she was
alive was impossible to determine, but the court relied on the presumption

of a continuance of a condition demonstrated to have been in existence at a
But see Keystone Steel &
previous time: Whiting v. Nicholl, 46 Ill. 230 (1867).
Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2S9 Ill. 587, 124 N. E. 542 (1919)', to the
effect that such presumption may not hold true as to persons living in war zones.
3 Section 24 of the Treaty of 1931 states: "A consular officer . . . shall . . .
have the right to appear personally or by delegate in all matters concerning the
administration and distribution of the estate of a deceased person under the
jurisdiction of the local authorities for all such heirs or legatees in said estate,
e.ither minors or adults, as may be non-residents and nationals of the country represented by the said consular officer with the same effect as if he held their power
of attorney to represent them unless such heirs of legatees themselves have apSee Marcellus
peared either in person or by duly authorized representative."
Donald A. R. von Redlich. The Law of Nations (World League for Permanent
Peace, 1937), 2d Ed., p. 603.
4 Cahill's Cons. Laws N. Y. 1930, Ch. 13, § 18.
•'30 N. Y. S. (2d) 658. 177 Misc. 384 (1941).
638 N. Y. S. (2d) 37, 265 App. Div. 878 (1942).
Payment to nationals of occupied countries has been temporarily suspended,
under 12 U. S. C. A. § 95a, by Executive Orders 8389, 8785, and 8832. See also
general order of the Probate Court of Cook County, Illinois, under date of August
6, 1941.
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has been found to have the right to make an election to take against
the will of the testator without any express direction whatsoever from
the widow of the latter. That the right of election is personal to the
widow seems to be well established, at least to the extent that it does
not survive her death so cannot thereafter be exercised by her heirs,'
her legal representatives,9 or her creditors, 1 unless so authorized by
statutory provision." Courts have even held that, where the surviving spouse is insane or incompetent, her committee or conservator cannot make the election for her,'12 unless expressly authorized by proper
court order. 3 Such decisions would seem to limit the right of election
to the surviving spouse only as "a personal right . . . inherent in the
particular individual to whom it is given, as distinguished from a right
which might be exercised by any other person whomsoever."".
Of course, the right is not so personal that the surviving spouse
must execute the essential papers personally as she may act through
a resident attorney in fact. Thus, a widow residing abroad once
executed a power of attorney giving her agent general powers to act
for her in connection with the estate of her deceased husband, and it
was held that the agent could elect to take against the will although
no specific authorization to make such election was designated. 15 Such
right may be delegated to a third person who may act independently
at his discretion, 16 even though the election is to be manifested by a
writing "signed by her."'1

7

Had the consul in the instant case pos-

8 Sippel v. Wolff, 333 Ill. 284. 164 N. E. 678 (1928) ; Welch v. Anderson. 28 Mo.
293 (1859) : Matter of Mihlman, 251 N. Y. S. 147, 140 Misc. 535 (1931) ; Crozier's
Appeal, 90 Pa. 384, 35 Am. Rep. 666 (1879).
9 Donald v. Portis, 42 Ala. 29 (1868) ; Matter of Ackler, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 128, 168
Misc. 623 (1938) ; Matter of Brill, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 966, 175 Misc. 236 (1940)
Matter of Youngs, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 811, 175 Misc. 716 (1940).
10 Eltzroth v. Binford, 71 Ind. 455 (1880).
11 See, for example, Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Haynes, 180 Tenn. 247, 174 S. W. (2d)
39 (1943).
12Heavenridge v. Nelson. 56 Ind. 90 (1877) ; Pinkerton v. Sargent, 102 Mass.
568 (1869).
13 Davis v. Mather, 309 Il1. 284, 141, N. E. 209 (1923) ; Andrews v. Bassett, 99
Mich. 449, 52 N. W. 743, 17 L. R. A. 296 (1892) ; Hardy v. Richards, 98 Miss. 625,
54 So. 76, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1210 (1911) ; Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, 59 Wis.
483. 17 N. W. 289. 48 Am. Rep. 532 (1883).
In Matter of Donnelly, 14 N. Y. S.
(2d) 700, 172 Misc. 107 (1939), it was held that a special guardian appointed to
protect the rights of absent heirs could not elect to take against the will to the
extent of having a portion of the testator's estate impounded, because the right
was purely personal to the wards and, being adults, they were in no sense wards
of the court.
14 Matter of MihIman, 251 N. Y. S. 147 at 149, 140 Misc. 535 (1931).
5 In re Celenza's Estate, 308 Pa. St. 186. 162 A. 456, 85 A. L. R. 851 (1932). See
also In re Minnich's Estate, 288 Pa. 354, 136 A. 236 (1927).
16 Page, The Law of Wills (W. H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati, 1941), 3d Ed., Vol.
4, § 1361, p. 32. See also note in 85 A. L. R. 859.
17 In
re Celenza's Estate, 308 Pa. St. 186, 162 A. 456, 85 A. L. R. 851 (1932). Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 169, provides for a written instrument "signed by the
surviving spouse."
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sessed such a power of attorney there would be no problem. But if it
could be said that he possessed such power by virtue of his office,
then his action on behalf of his national should be upheld.
In that regard, it was decided as early as 1821 that a consul had
the right to "assert or defend the rights of property of the individuals
of his nation,"' 8 even in the absence of express treaty provision. Such
power has been held, in some instances, to extend to maintaining affirmatively the rights of his countrymen as by collecting a distributive
share due from an etsate, 19 though in others he has been limited to
2
maintaining action but not personally collecting the proceeds thereof. 1
Absent special authority by treaty or executed power of attorney, it
has been held that he could collect workmen's compensation for the
benefit of the alien widow and child since the consul has been said to
be the "standing, fully authorized, and qualified personal and immediate representative, for all purposes, of a citizen of his country ...
' 21
having any interest to be cared for within the consular district.
The breadth of such decisions would seem to suggest that the consul
enjoys powers not necessarily confined to the treaty or any written
instrument of appointment but which emanate from the very position
itself.
Aside from general powers, the consul in the instant case relied
upon a provision of the treaty that stipulated that the sphere of his
authority to act for his nationals should be "as if he held their power
of attorney. 2- 2 Had he actually possessed personal authorization,
which he probably would have in normal times, there would be no
doubt of his right to make the election. It would not seem as though
a different result should be achieved merely because the authority
was conferred by a treaty promulgated by the sovereign on behalf
of its nationals, for such treaty would be binding on the latter as well
as on the citizens of this country. 3 Although the scope of the implied
power of attorney is not expressed in the treaty, it would seem to
intend a general one as no limitation is found thereon. While powers
of attorney are subject to strict construction, the same include not
only expressly specified powers but also such other powers as are
essential in effectuating the expressed ones.2

4

When it is remembered

that the rule of strict construction should not be applied with such
rigor as to "destroy the very purpose of the power or to preclude the
ascertainment in a proper way of what the language was meant to
isThe Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 152 at 162, 5 L. Ed. 229 at 233 (1821).
19 In re Tartaglio's Estate, 33 N. Y. S.1121, 12 Misc. 245 (1895).
20

Lachowicz v. Lechowicz, 181 Md. 478, 30 A. (2d) 793 (1943).

21

Vujic v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 220 F. 390 at 392 (1914).

22

See text of treaty in note 3, ante.

23

U. S. Const., Art. VI.

24 2 Am. Jur., Agency, § 31.
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accomplish, ' 25 it would seem that the treaty language here concerned
is broad enough to warrant the making of an election of the type here
spouse might well
involved. If it were not, the rights of the absent
26
be lost by default through no fault of her own.
EDITH H. VAUGHAN
252 C. J. S. Agency, § 98c(3), p. 1223-4.
26 Cahill's Cons. Laws N. Y. 1930, Ch. 13, § 18(7), permits the Surrogate to
enlarge the time for making the election, provided application is made before its

expiration, for a period of not exceeding six months upon any one application. The
provision in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 169, is limited to cases where litigation
is pending that affects the share of the surviving spouse in the estate.

